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I. INTRODUCTION 
In seeking to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
health authorities worldwide are reflecting on their ability to 
trace and track those who might have contracted the virus, and 
in turn, to know and protect those humans likely to be exposed.  
We suggest that the issue around technological innovations, 
including so-called contact tracing apps, is not whether they 
have a role to play in containing the pandemic, but rather, how 
those apps are used and what protections and rights might be 
given and guaranteed to concerned citizens using those apps. 
 
This paper examines the difficulties that have arisen in 
Australia in the use of its contact-tracing app.  We examine the 
privacy implications around the use of the app, the wider 
economic imperative, and the balancing of those concerns 
against the health threat of the COVID-19 pandemic.  We posit 
that default options are superior in times of emergency and 
rather than begging for the adoption of lifesaving technology, we 
suggest that the evidence gathered by behavioral economists 
provides an apposite and powerful alternative worthy of 
consideration. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The key with a pandemic, such as COVID-19, is to limit the 
rate of spread as quickly and efficiently as possible.  One method 
used by health authorities is utilizing existing technology that 
can be easily co-opted or adapted.1  For example, apps have been 
developed to provide breaking news and reports, information 
and updates, and geofencing of hot spots.2  In Australia and 
 
1 Such methods were proposed by elite academics at the beginning of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. See Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop 
coronavirus transmission and ease us out of lockdown, UNIV. OF OXFORD: 
CORONAVIRUS RESEARCH (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-can-
slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown. 
2 See Patrick Anthony Drury et al., Ethical considerations to guide the use 
of digital proximity tracking technologies for COVID-19 contact tracing, at 1, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (2020), 
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-
Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1, for a discussion by the World Health 
Organization regarding the use of digital proximity tracking technologies as a 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
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other countries, a form of contact tracing, which includes 
feedback, has also been incorporated in the apps to notify those 
who are vulnerable or close to otherwise unknown dangers in a 
timely way.3  The ability to use technological innovation, 
including so-called contact tracing apps, is useful; however, 
these technologies pose implications for governments and those 
they seek to protect with regard to how individual citizens’ 
information and data collected by the app will be used and 
protected.4 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports daily on the 
status of the COVID-19 pandemic world-wide.5  As of October 9, 
2020, there were over 50,000,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 
and over 1,200,000 reported COVID-19 related deaths globally.6  
While comparisons with the Bubonic Plague in the fourteenth 
century—which killed around 200 million people7—have 
inevitably surfaced, we posit that comparisons to historic events 
are somewhat crude, because of significant differences in 
economies, living standards, and health care between the points 
of comparison.  Gavi, the global vaccine alliance,8 asserts that 
 
potential tool to support contact tracing for COVID-19. 
3 Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests 
epidemic control with digital contact tracing,      AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT 
SCIENCE, May 8, 2020, at 4. 
4 Todd Ehret, Data privacy laws collide with contact tracing efforts; 
privacy is prevailing, REUTERS (July 21, 2020, 2:36 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/data-
privacy-laws-collide-with-contact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailing-
idUSKCN24M1NL. Concerns around the information collected from apps 
continue even after testing and are often complex considerations, balancing 
health issues against privacy protection. See Genetic Alliance, Advocates are 
Leaders in BioBanking, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U0ES0yDWryM. 
5 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update and 
Weekly Operational Update, WHO, 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-
reports (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
6 WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WHO (Nov. 9, 2020, 
2:46 PM), https://covid19.who.int. 
7 Pat Lee Shipman, The Bright Side of the Black Death, AM. SCIENTIST, 
Nov.–Dec. 2014, at 410. 
8 See GAVI: THE VACCINE ALL., http://www.gavi.org (last visited Nov. 12, 
2020). Gavi’s partners include, inter alia, UNICEF, Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, The World Health Organization, and The World Bank. Id. 
3
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recent pandemics, such as the Asian flu of 1957–1958—which 
killed around 1.1 million people—and the Hong Kong flu of 
1968–1970—which killed around one million people—provides a 
more useful comparison.9  Nonetheless, as the worldwide 
fatalities from COVID-19 reached close to 800,000 in August 
2020,10 and with so-called second wave effects being experienced, 
longer-run comparisons are inevitable, even if somewhat 
flawed.11 
 
While disease and death—together with the community 
concerns around protecting the vulnerable—are motivating 
factors for governments to take action, economic considerations 
appear to be equally compelling.  The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Blog predicts that the economic downturn caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic is the worst since the Great Depression 
and that world economic growth will fall to negative three 
percent.12  The IMF provides a comprehensive summary of 
discretionary actions taken by 197 economies worldwide.13  
These measures include public spending adjustments, taxation 
measures, and other policy support, summarized by country.14 
 
The variation and degree of border closures are concerning 
since a key commonality with COVID-19 and previous global 
 
9 How does COVID-19 compare to past pandemics?, GAVI: THE VACCINE 
ALL. (June 1, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/how-does-covid-19-
compare-past-pandemics. 
10 Lisa Shumaker, Global Coronavirus Deaths Exceed 800,000, REUTERS 
(Aug. 22, 2020, 4:48 PM), reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
casualties/global-coronavirus-deaths-exceed-800000-idUSKBN25I0QS. 
11 See How does COVID-19 compare to past pandemics?, supra note 9. 
12 Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since 
the Great Depression, IMFBLOG (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-
downturn-since-the-great-depression/. 
13 Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
[IMF], https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19 (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
14 Id.; see also Lora Jones, Daniele Palumbo & David Brown, Coronavirus: 
A visual guide to the economic impact, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225 (examining COVID-19’s 
negative impact worldwide on stock markets, unemployment rates, travel, oil 
prices, and shopping). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
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pandemics is the use of masks15 and isolation,16 with the latter 
factor being the primary predictor of containment,17 although 
evidence for this claim is primarily anecdotal because of the 
absence of verifiable data.18 
 
The variability of measures taken in different regions and 
the medical uncertainties associated with COVID-19 show that 
the desire to keep economies operating as being both firm and 
unrelenting.19  In the absence of data, we posit that economic 
objectives are playing a key role in government decisions around 
physical isolation and that government measures taken across 
 
15 Bruno J. Strasser & Thomas Schlich, The Art of Medicine: A History of 
the Medical Mask and the Rise of Throwaway Culture, 396 LANCET 19, 19–20 
(2020); see generally C. Raina MacIntyre et al., Face Mask Use and Control of 
Respiratory Virus Transmission in Households, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES J. 233 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2662657/pdf/08-
1167_finalRCME.pdf, for a post-survey analysis regarding the effectiveness of 
different types of masks for preventing the spread of viruses. 
16 Phillip Connor, More than nine-in-ten people worldwide live in countries 
with travel restrictions amid COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/?p=361112. 
17 Laura Spinney, Closed borders and ‘black weddings’: what the 1918 flu 
teaches us about coronavirus, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2020, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/closed-borders-and-black-
weddings-what-the-1918-flu-teaches-us-about-coronavirus. The U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that both physical and 
social distancing is helpful because COVID-19 “spreads mainly among people 
who are in close contact . . . [via] droplets from their mouth or nose [which] are 
launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby” and 
that inhalation via the lungs is also possible. See Social Distancing: Keep a 
Safe Distance to Slow the Spread, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-
distancing.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2020). Further, because “people who are 
infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of 
COVID-19[,]” the virus may be unwittingly spread. Id. It is also the case that 
social isolation reduces the contact with surfaces and environments where the 
individual has less control over its cleanliness. Id. 
18 David Adam, The Effects of Physical Isolation on the Pandemic 
Quantified, THESCIENTIST (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-
opinion/the-effects-of-physical-isolation-on-the-pandemic-quantified-67407. 
19 Emeline Han et al., Lessons Learnt From Easing COVID-19 
Restrictions: An Analysis of Countries and Regions in Asia Pacific and Europe, 
396 LANCET 1524, 1524–25 (2020); see Policy Responses to COVID-19, supra 
note 13. 
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the world thus far show that the varying degrees of physical 
isolation, viewed as “necessary,” are informed by the relative 
weight given to each of the above motivating factors. This results 
in significant variability among countries when comparing their 
interests and relative actions with respect to border closures.20  
Technology now plays a role in assisting governments in the 
local management of the pandemic, with the aim of improving 
both the health and economic position as quickly as possible.21 
III. BIOBANK DATA 
Data retrieval through the use of digital technology is 
essential to governments and others to assist with providing 
timely responses in urgent circumstances, such as a pandemic.22  
In 2013, the European Commission published a report setting 
out, based on empirical evidence, its view on the best means of 
governing biobanks and biomolecular resource collections.23  The 
Report notes that biobanks are a more recent phenomenon and 
mostly have developed from the rise of cancer research.24  
 
20 Connor, supra note 16. 
21 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN/DESA Policy Brief #61: COVID-
19: Embracing Digital Government during the Pandemic and Beyond (Apr. 14, 
2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-
brief-61-covid-19-embracing-digital-government-during-the-pandemic-and-
beyond/. 
22 Id. 
23 See BIOBANKING AND BIOMOLECULAR RES. RSCH. INFRASTRUCTURE & 
EUR. RSCH. INFRASTRUCTURE CONSORTIUM (BBMRI-ERIC), BIOBANKS AND THE 
PUBLIC: GOVERNING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH RESOURCES IN EUROPE 11 (2013), 
https://www.bbmri-eric.eu/wp-content/uploads/BBMRI-Biobanks-and-the-
Public.pdf [hereinafter BBMRI Report], for a summary of research undertaken 
by the Working Group of Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) of the 
BioBanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI) 
project. The Report makes several points regarding biological sampling, 
including that it occurs across a variety of sites and for a variety of purposes, 
that it comes in the advent of great interest by governments in public health 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that tissue samples have been 
stored “at least since the beginning of the 19th century.” Id. 
24 Id. at 13. Because researchers require large data samples, some 
biobanks are “created by compiling collections of samples and data from 
multiple research projects . . . .” See Maureen E. Smith & Sharon Aufox, 
Biobanking: The Melding of Research with Clinical Care, 1 CURRENT GENETIC 
MED. REP. 122, 123 (2013); see also Catherine A. McCarty et al., The eMERGE 
Network: A consortium of biorepositories linked to electronic medical records 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
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Helpfully, the Report attempts to explain the word “biobank” as 
“an ambiguous term with more than one meaning, usually 
referring to a hybrid infrastructure that links collections of 
biological materials obtained from healthy or diseased 
individuals to diverse collections of medical or biomedical data, 
and including patient records.”25  Because biobanks hold the 
medical samples and biological information around those 
samples, they are holders of valuable and confidential medical 
data.26  The Report clarifies that the term “biobank” is not a 
strictly technical term, it “rather refers to a set of practices for 
collecting and storing biological materials, as well as medical 
and biomedical data.”27  For the purposes of this paper, we adopt 
the broader practical definition of “biobank” to include biological, 
medical, and biomedical data. 
 
The practice of medicine and related biological endeavors 
today are neither confined to professional practice, nor 
government laboratories, or hospitals.  The growth of biobanking 
coincides with the commercial development of related research 
and private enterprises, which seek to exploit the collected 
information and samples for commercial gain.28  An example of 
a for-profit enterprise is Amgen, a private shareholder-based 
multinational U.S.-based company.29  Amgen is one of the 
world’s largest biotechnological companies, turning over 
approximately 25 billion USD per year.30  Amgen and other 
private companies hold data that is private.31 
 
data for conducting genomic studies, BMC MED. GENOMICS, Jan. 26, 2011, at 2 
(discussing various biobanks who cooperate with one another to further 
research by network, often between countries). 
25 BBMRI Report, supra note 23, at 13. 
26 See id. at 10. 
27 Id. at 14. 
28 Carlo Petrini, Ethical and Legal Considerations Regarding the 
Ownership and Commercial Use of Human Biological Materials and Their 
Derivatives, 3 J. BLOOD MED. 87, 88 (2012). 
29 AMGEN, https://www.amgen.com/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
30 Agmen Reports Second Quarter 2020 Financial Results, AMGEN (July 
28, 2020), https://investors.amgen.com/news-releases/news-release-
details/amgen-reports-second-quarter-2020-financial-results. 
31 Privacy Statement, AMGEN, https://www.amgen.com.au/privacy-
statement/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). Amgen asserts that it is “careful to only 
collect and/or use personal identifiable information for the purposes stated in 
7
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It is not just the endeavor or enterprise of biobanking that 
is of concern, but it is also the variety of ways in which data is 
held, and the opportunity for cross-collaboration of biobank data 
between for-profit and non-profit institutions.32  Cross-
collaboration may present opportunities across manifold 
software platforms, which allows unrelated third-party interests 
to mine or acquire the data for their own unknown, and possibly 
commercial, purposes.33 
 
The vast number of technological networks and 
collaborations that hold medical and biomedical information for 
a variety of uses, including, for example, the development of 
precision medicines to treat rare diseases,34 means that it is 
possible for such data to assist in determining the likely spread 
of disease which is evident in countries where the data is shared, 
such as the United States, much of Europe, and parts of Asia-
Pacific.35  Where data sharing already exists—including the sale 
of data between private biobanks—it is possible that even 
further sharing may be used by governments who better 
 
our Privacy Authorization for our Patient Support Programs and as necessary 
to provide the services and/or programs the patient or customer chooses to 
enroll into.” Amgen’s Privacy Pledge to U.S. Patients Enrolling in Patient 
Support Programs for Our Marketed Products, AMGEN, 
https://www.amgen.com/about/how-we-operate/policies-practices-and-
disclosures/privacy-pledge-to-patients/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). “Amgen 
practices are consistent with federal and state privacy laws.” Id. “Amgen 
program enrollment is voluntary and always provides patients with an easy 
option to cancel participation.” Id. 
32 See Smith & Aufox, supra note 24, at 123. 
33 See id. at 125–26, for a discussion concerning the informational power 
surrounding the aggregation and sharing of data for research and clinical 
implementation. This includes unwitting stakeholders. See also Byron Tau, 
U.S. Government Contractor Embedded Software in Apps to Track Phones, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
government-contractor-embedded-software-in-apps-to-track-phones-
11596808801 (reporting that Anomaly Six LLC, a U.S. Virginia-based 
company, maintains ties to the U.S. defense and intelligence communities who 
are contact-tracing hundreds of millions of mobile phones worldwide). 
34 See, for example, Mission and Goals, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/mission-goals (last updated July, 
27, 2017), which is one agency that “develop[s], maintain[s], and renew[s] 
scientific human and physical resources that will ensure the Nation’s 
capability to prevent disease . . . .” 
35 Han, supra note 19, at 1526–27. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
2020	 An	Australian	Conundrum	 51	
understand exposure to diseases in order to determine where a 
pandemic, such as COVID-19, exists.36  The difficulty of 
identifying when it is necessary to make such determinations 
remains.  There is little doubt, however, that this is a whole-of-
society problem, rather than one confined to a geographic region 
or particular government purview.37  It is also complex because 
the vast store of private and public biomedical and medical 
information allows for analysis in unexpected purposes, such as 
utilization for widespread public analysis.38  This, in turn, allows 
for the development of a coalition of interests in using the 
information in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.39 
 
Furthermore, existing databases that can be shared may be 
enhanced by the addition of information gathered from apps 
installed by individuals.  Generally, and of more concern in 
 
36 For example, at the outbreak of COVID-19, “China established a 
nationwide telecom data analysis platform under the leadership of the 
Ministry of Information Industry Technology” allowing telecom carriers to 
provide a tracking record of cell phone users’ locations for up to thirty days. 
Contact tracing apps: A new world for data privacy, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 
(Oct. 2020), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-
us/knowledge/publications/d7a9a296/contact-tracing-apps-a-new-world-for-
data-privac [hereinafter Norton Rose Fulbright Study]. 
37 See Open access to facilitate research and information on COVID-19, 
UNESCO, 
https://en.unesco.org/covid19/communicationinformationresponse/opensolutio
ns (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
38 See Sherrie Xie et al., Enhancing Electronic Health Record Data with 
Geospatial Information, 2017 AMIA JOINT SUMMITS ON TRANSNAT’L SCI. PROC. 
123, 123–32, for an example of a coalition that is already engaged in other 
contexts, such as geospatial analysis combined with electronic health records 
to improve diagnosis and assist asthma patients. Specifically, these 
proceedings note that “[s]ignificant geospatial variability of asthma 
exacerbations w[ere] found using generalized additive models, even after 
adjusting for demographic factors” and that the “work shows that geospatial 
data can be used to cost-effectively enhance EHR [electronic health record] 
data.” Id. at 123. 
39 This warrants further thought and development. See generally FLORIAN 
RABITZ, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS (2017); and CHRISTINA SAMPOGNA, 
CREATION AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC RESEARCH DATABASES (2006), 
for discussions regarding the commonality governance architecture in world 
politics with genetic resources to attempt to remove asymmetries and garner 
widespread access and benefit-sharing. 
9
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recent times, are government directives that claim that the use 
of personal data gathering is justifiable to safeguard individuals 
and others in their particular geographic location.  Governments 
or private providers, as such, who hold valuable data can no 
longer guarantee that the data will be used solely for one 
purpose, or, at best, for purposes consistent with the intended 
reason stated for the collection of the data.  This is because the 
transfer and sharing of biomedical and medical data will 
inevitably become caught up in the collision of data and 
analytics.40  This, in turn, means that soon, private providers 
will not be the keepers of the data who control the users of such 
data.41  Based on trends observed in 2020, we predict that the 
traditional data and analytics roles in information technology 
(IT) will remain in diminishing prominence and that other 
stakeholders, such as those representing consumer use, research 
applications, planning, and other exploratory purposes, will 
become more apparent.42  This means that biobanking, along 
with cross-sharing of data, will not only just continue to occur, 
but from a variety of sources.  What is more troublingly is that 
the data will be mined and used by any interested party able to 
obtain legal (or illegal) access.43  Much has been written around 
the potential privacy issues that arise from these increasingly 
complex possibilities.44 
 
40 See Laurence Goasduff, Gartner Top 10 Trends in Data and Analytics 
for 2020, GARTNER (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-10-trends-in-data-
and-analytics-for-2020/. 
41 See id. 
42 This is an entirely reasonable prediction given the pace at which data 
is being collected and the variety of uses to which it is being put to use. See 
also id. (noting the rapid effect graph technologies are expected to have on the 
ability to collect and analyze data retrieved from organizations, people, and 
transactions by 2023). 
43 The question of illegal access is important but lies beyond the scope of 
this paper. See Wencheng Yang & Song Wang, Fingerprint and face scanners 
aren’t as secure as we think they are, CONVERSATION (Mar. 5, 2019, 11:00 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/fingerprint-and-face-scanners-arent-as-secure-as-
we-think-they-are-112414, for a list of ways in which biometric data security 
might be breached. 
44 Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public 
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 108 (2019); 
see also JP Raynal, Note, With Great Technology Comes Great Responsibility: 
Why Smartphone Users’ Biometric Data Needs to Be Protected, 48 HOFSTRA L. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
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IV. CONTACT TRACING 
Mobile computer applications are important because they 
enable contact-tracing, the ability to trace and monitor the 
contacts of infected people, and the follow-on implications 
associated with a disease.45  Such contact tracing is critical to 
containing the disease and subsequent economic recovery.46  
Contact-tracing apps, therefore, assist governments in 
determining likely infection and specific areas requiring 
isolation, which is consistent with the leading historical 
indicator of curbing pandemics via the physical isolation of 
populations.47  Contact tracing is additionally useful because it 
 
REV. 179, 179–80 (2019) (discussing cell phones); Lauren Stewart, Big Data 
Discrimination: Maintaining Protection of Individual Privacy Without 
Disincentivizing Businesses’ Use of Biometric Data to Enhance Security, 60 
B.C. L. REV.  349, 349–50 (2019) (discussing data discrimination); Jordan T. 
Shewmaker, Note, New Frontiers in Medical Privacy: Protecting the Biometric 
Data of Patients in the Healthcare Industry, 106  KY. L. J. 813, 815 (2018) 
(discussing medical collection in hospitals); Grayson Colt Holmes, Note, The 
New Employment Verification Act: The Functionality and Constitutionality of 
Biometrics in the Hiring Process, 43 CONN. L. REV. 673, 678 (2010) (discussing 
employment); Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the Posse 
Comitatus Act, 66 EMORY L. J. 697, 699 (2017) (discussing military 
surveillance); David Uberti, Police Requests for Google Users’ Location 
Histories Face New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-requests-for-google-users-location-
histories-face-new-scrutiny-11595842201 (discussing law enforcement); 
Google Helps Police With Geofence Warrants But Warns of Potential Privacy 
Problems, WALL ST. J. PRO: CYBERSECURITY (July 27, 2020, 8:45 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-daily-google-helps-police-with-geofence-
warrants-but-warns-of-potential-privacy-problems-blackbaud-hack-buggy-
email-at-election-offices-11595853947?st=s2nk1yc826toap5 (discussing law 
enforcement). Note that this problem is not germane to the health industry 
and in banking and finance, similar issues arise. See Meredith E. Bock, 
Biometrics and Banking: Assessing the Adequacy of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 309–10 (2020), for an argument that the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s (GLBA) privacy provisions should be updated to 
cope with biometric privacy issues. 
45 See Contact Tracing: Get and Keep America Open: Supporting states, 
tribes, localities, and territories, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/contact-
tracing/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2020). 
46 See Aaron Hutchins, Coronavirus: The bearers of bad news: Contact 
tracers are the new front line in our pandemic battle and economic recovery 
depends on them. No pressure, there, MACLEAN’S, Aug. 2020 at 48, 51–52. 
47 See Robert Hinch et. al., Effective Configurations of a Digital Contact 
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helps avoid the total shutdown of a country or a region’s economy 
as a large-scale response to a pandemic.48 
 
Contact-tracing apps were developed to help tackle the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and are based on two components.49  
First, the technological component requires that there is 
precision in determining the location of an event as well as the 
protection of data about a person being kept secure.50  Second, 
the epidemiological component must be sound and sensitivity 
analysis tested in simulation so that the app can be audited and 
optimized as data becomes available.51 
 
The success of a contact-tracing app is measured by its 
ability to reduce onward transmission of a virus and, according 
to the NHSX Report, its simultaneous impact on “minimising 
the number of people in quarantine.”52  It seems that the latter 
impact might usually be followed by control of transmission of 
the virus.  Nonetheless, whether a reduction of those who might 
have otherwise been quarantined is a difficult matter of 
estimation since it posits a known quantity—the number of 
people in fact quarantined, against the more difficult-to-
determine unknown number that might have been in 
quarantine—but for the operation of the contact-tracing app.  
The success of such an app, at least for the NHSX Report, will 
be enhanced where self-reporting of symptoms is prevalent, 
along with rapid follow up of cases.53  In some countries, because 
people over the age of 70 are unlikely to utilize cell phones and 
have an increased vulnerability to COVID-19, the NHSX Report 
 
Tracing App: A report to NHSX 1–2 (Apr. 16, 2020, 
https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/1009/Report_-
_Effective_App_Configurations.pdf?1587531217 [hereinafter NHSX Report]. 
See also Contact tracing apps: Which countries are doing what, 
ETHEALTHWORLD (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/diagnostics/contact-
tracing-apps-which-countries-are-doing-what/75440095, for an outline of the 
movement toward contact tracing apps. 
48 NHSX Report, supra note 47 at 2. 
49 Id. at 1. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 2. 
53 Id. 
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recommends that they fully or partially self-isolate.54  The 
NHSX Report also finds that under those circumstances “the 
epidemic can be suppressed with 80% of all smartphone users 
using the app . . . .”55  Additional information on how the NHSX 
Report models information and makes assumptions is contained 
therein.56 
 
One issue arising from the above is the use of smartphones 
which is required, as well as the self-reporting required to 
ensure the integrity of gathered data.  It is not clear whether 
any country has succeeded in achieving those twin goals, or more 
generally, that any has been able to report that contact-tracing 
apps have been successful in containing COVID-19.57 
 
Various reasons are posited for both the success and lack 
thereof of contact-tracing apps.  One reason is the reluctance of 
some countries to use the Apple-Google “decentralized” 
frameworks for contact tracing apps, which are not based on 
GPS tracking, but rather Bluetooth® technology in order to 
protect user data and to extend the range of the app while 
traveling.58  The key point is whether a Bluetooth® contact-
tracing app has the ability to be designed with a guarantee that 
user privacy and security are embedded features.59 
 
 
54 NHSX Report, supra note 47 at 2. 
55 Id. at 3. 
56 See id. at 8–11, 13–15, 22–29 (utilizing graphs and models to support 
assumptions based on self-diagnoses, contact-tracing, and utilization of an 
app). 
57 Ryan Browne, Why coronavirus contact-tracing apps aren’t yet the ‘game 
changer’ authorities hoped they’d be, CNBC (July 3, 2020, 9:07 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/03/why-coronavirus-contact-tracing-apps-
havent-been-a-game-changer.html. 
58 Id.; see also Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE: COVID-19 
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing (last visited Nov. 14, 2020), for 
the discussion of the joint initiative between Google and Apple to assist 
governments with “reduc[ing] the spread of the virus with user privacy and 
security central to the design” by using Bluetooth technology. 
59 Apple and Google do not guarantee the user privacy of those 
downloading their contact-tracing app, but rather say their Bluetooth 
technology will “help governments and health agencies reduce the spread of 
the virus . . . .” See Privacy-Preserving Contract Tracing, supra note 58 
(emphasis added). 
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It seems that user privacy and security cannot be 
guaranteed, which is a vexing issue.  If it is then of sufficient 
concern that individuals will not download a contact-tracing app 
on their phone at all.  Of those who do load such an app, there 
might be variability around whether the app is correctly 
installed, whether it is installed but then uninstalled, and, 
where the function exists, whether the installed app is activated 
at all, some of the time, or all of the time.  All of these activation 
options affect the ability of the app to gather and report data.60  
This, in turn, makes it difficult to ascertain the ideal number of 
users as per the NHSX Report’s model.61  How governments have 
determined the correct amount of social isolation definitively put 
in place in the absence of contact-tracing apps operating at 
desired functional levels, appears to be a matter of 
“guesstimating.”  Australia—whose constitutional makeup is 
that of a Federation—is a prime example of one of the various 
State governments that have simply closed borders between 
states due to a rise in reported instances of COVID-19.62  Those 
border closures have, for the most part, been against the 
recommendations of the Australian Commonwealth (federal) 
government and, in two cases, have caused constitutional 
challenges to be raised by citizens.63 
V. THE COVIDSAFE APP 
On March 18, 2020, Governor-General of Australia David 
Hurley, pursuant to section 475 of the Australian Biosecurity 
 
60 See David Nield, How to restrict the amount of data apps collect about 
you,      NEWS ATLAS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://newatlas.com/data-collection-and-
privacy/53959/. 
61 See NHSX Report, supra note 47, at 3. 
62 Jason Scott & Edward Johnson, Australia’s Most Populous States Close 
Their Border After Coronavirus Cases Spike, TIME (July 6, 2020, 4:36 AM), 
https://time.com/5863138/australia-victoria-new-south-wales-coronavirus-
spike-border/. 
63 One challenge was raised by a politician and the other raised by a 
businessperson. See Kyle Bridge, State border closures and the Australian 
Constitution – are they legal?, KELLS (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.kells.com.au/insights/local-government/state-border-closures-
and-the-australian-constitution-are-they-legal/; Thomas Allen, Open The 
Borders - A High Court Australia Constitutional Challenge, ARMSTRONG LEGAL, 
https://www.armstronglegal.com.au/open-the-borders-a-high-court-australia-
constitutional-challenge/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
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Act 2015 (the Biosecurity Act),64 made a declaration to 
particularly address COVID-19.65  The First COVID-19 
Declaration,66 asserted that COVID-19 had entered Australia 
and had pandemic potential.67  The declaration has since been 
extended pursuant to the powers contained in section 476 of the 
Biosecurity Act.68  These are wide powers accompanied by fines 
 
64 “The Governor-General may declare that a human biosecurity 
emergency exists if the Health Minister is satisfied that: (a) a listed human 
disease is posing a severe and immediate threat, or is causing harm, to human 
health on a nationally significant scale; and (b) the declaration is necessary to 
prevent or control: (i) the entry of the listed human disease into Australian 
territory or a part of Australian territory; or (ii) the emergence, establishment 
or spread of the listed human disease in Australian territory or a part of 
Australian territory.” Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) ch 8 pt 2 div 2 s 475 (Austl.) 
[hereinafter Biosecurity Act of 2015]. 
65 The Governor-General of Australia, being the representative of Queen 
Elizabeth II, is Australia’s Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Australian Defence Force. About the Governor-General: The role of the 
Governor-General, GOVERNOR-GEN. COMMONWEALTH AUSTL., 
https://www.gg.gov.au/about-governor-general/role-governor-general (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2020). His Excellency General, the Honorable David Hurey AC 
DSC (Ret.) took the advice of the Health Minister to declare a human 
biosecurity emergency with respect to COVID-19 pursuant to section 475 of the 
Biosecurity Act. Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human 
Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Declaration 2020 (Cth) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter First COVID-19 Declaration]. Section 6 of the Declaration states: 
“[h]uman coronavirus with pandemic potential is an infectious disease: (a) that 
has entered Australian territory; and (b) that is fatal in some cases; and (c) 
that there was no vaccine against, or antiviral treatment for, immediately 
before the commencement of this instrument; and (d) that is posing a severe 
and immediate threat to human health on a nationally significant scale.” Id. s 
6. 
66 Section 7 of the First COVID-19 Declaration states that the declaration 
ends on the last day of three months from the date of registration of the 
instrument. First COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 65, s 7. Accordingly, a 
second declaration was issued, effective May 15, 2020, with a sunset provision 
effective September 17, 2020. Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) 
(Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) Variation (Extension) 
Instrument 2020 (Cth) ss 2, 4 (Austl.) [hereinafter Second COVID-19 
Declaration]. 
67 First COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 65, s 6. 
68 Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, ch 8 pt 2 div 2 s 476. Section 476 
of the Biosecurity Act allows the biosecurity emergency period to vary over a 
period of up to three months, in this case, an extension, where the Health 
Minister is satisfied that the disease continues to pose a severe and immediate 
threat, or is causing harm on a national scale, and, that the extension is 
necessary to prevent or control the entry of the disease into Australia or the 
15
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or imprisonment where directions are not followed.69  It is 
apparent then, that the Australian government had the power, 
once the declaration was made, for its Health Minister to make 
emergency requirements and directions in respect of contact-
tracing.70  While traditional measures such as border closure and 
self-isolation have been introduced, no compulsory contact-
tracing arrangements have been made; although it is suggested 
that section 477 of the Act allows a decision of this nature,71 thus 
allowing for an overriding of the usual privacy protections 
offered to citizens in non-crisis times. 
 
One of the interesting international aspects of COVID-19 is 
the different measures taken by governments worldwide,72 as 
well as commentary on the effectiveness of implemented 
measures.73  While contact-tracing is mentioned in the 
literature, it is not distinguished from other containment 
measures, including physical distancing.  Moreover, it remains 
unclear whether containment measures in general are 
universally effective.74  As a caveat to this observation, it is clear 
 
establishment or spread of the disease. Id. 
69 Id. ch 8 pt 2 div 6 s 479. Section 479 of the Biosecurity Act states that a 
person who fails to comply with directions will commit an offense, carrying a 
penalty of five years imprisonment. Id. 
70 See id. s 477. 
71 See id. s 477(1). Section 477(1) of the Biosecurity Act authorized the 
Health Minister to make any determination deemed necessary. Id. 
72 See Hannah Ritchie et al., Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), OUR 
WORLD DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus (last updated Nov. 14, 
2020). The measures taken by governments and the relation of the number of 
cases of COVID-19 compared with measures taken may be “tracked” on 
numerous websites. See, e.g., id.; Track government measures on COVID-19 
with the Oxford Government Response Tracker, EUR. DATA PORTAL (Sept. 4, 
2020), https://www.europeandataportal.eu/it/impact-studies/covid-19/track-
government-measures-covid-19-oxford-government-response-tracker 
[hereinafter Oxford Gov’t Response Tracker]. 
73 See, for example, Rabail Chaudhry et al., A country level analysis 
measuring the impact of government actions, country preparedness and 
socioeconomic factors on COVID-19 mortality and related health outcomes, 
LANCET: ECLINICALMEDICINE, July 2020, at 1, 1, for an unsurprising suggestion 
that “low levels of national preparedness, scale of testing and population 
characteristics were associated with increased national caseload and overall 
mortality.” 
74 See id. at 2. The authors note that “[m]easures such as the detection 
and isolation of infected individuals, contact-tracing, quarantine measures, 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/2
2020	 An	Australian	Conundrum	 59	
that the means of implementation, such as the restrictiveness of 
interventions and the strictness of their enforcement, all have 
an important role to play in their effectiveness; hence, the 
interest in and importance of research that includes shared and 
updated data for comparison. 
 
Various countries have touted or developed contact tracing 
apps, including the UK’s National Health Service (NHS),75 
Germany,76 Singapore,77 Japan,78 and others.79  MIT has even 
created a website to track the various reiterations of contact 
 
physical distancing, and closure of non-essential businesses have become 
major components of public health guidance, aiming to reduce the spread of 
further infection, and prevent health system strain[,]” and furthermore, 
“[a]lthough containment measures implemented in countries such as China, 
South Korea, and Taiwan have reduced new cases by more than 90%, this has 
not been the case in many other countries such as Italy, Spain and the United 
States.” Id. 
75 Gareth Iacobucci, Sixty seconds on . . . the contact tracing app, 369 BMJ 
169, 171 (2020), https://www.bmj.com/bmj/section-
pdf/1026718?path=/bmj/369/8244/This_Week.full.pdf. This announced a trial 
on the Isle of Wight, id., which was later dropped in favor of an app based on 
the Google and Apple model. See Jacqui Wise, UK drops its own contact tracing 
app to switch to Apple and Google model, 369 BMJ 463, 466–67 (2020), 
https://www.bmj.com/bmj/section-
pdf/1029956?path=/bmj/369/8251/This_Week.full.pdf. 
76 Dominik Rehse, Contact-Tracing-App: Mit Anreizen und Tempo zur App 
[Contact-Tracing: With incentives and speed for App], 100 WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 
310, 311 (2020), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/221988/1/10-1007-
s10273-020-2642-2.pdf. Germany eventually adopted the Google/Apple model 
after the announcement of a joint effort by Deutsche Telekom and SAP. Id. 
77 Trace Together, Safer Together, TRACETOGEHTER, 
https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/55/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). The 
Government Technology Agency of Singapore advertised an incentive for their 
app users with the opportunity to “win $55 Vouchers when you use Trace 
Together and Safe Entry.” Id. Singapore is credited with creating the world’s 
first major Bluetooth contact tracing app. See Charlotte Jee, Is a successful 
contact tracing app possible? These countries think so, MIT TECH REV. (Aug. 10, 
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/covid-contract-
tracing-app-germany-ireland-success. 
78 The June 2020 launch of the Japanese app, “Cocoa” (contact-confirming 
application), has been difficult. See Satoshi Sugiyama, Japan’s contact-tracing 
app suspended again to fix input glitch preventing alerts, JAPAN TIMES (July 
11, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/11/national/japans-
contact-tracing-app-glitch/. 
79 Jee, supra note 77. 
17
60	 PACE	INT’L	L.	REV.	 Vol.	33.1	
tracing apps throughout the world.80 
 
On April 26, 2020, the Australian federal government 
launched the COVIDSafe Software Application (the app).81  The 
Australian Prime Minister suggested that the more people who 
download the app,82 the safer the app users, their family, and 
their community would be, and ultimately, by downloading this 
app, the sooner safety restrictions would be lifted, allowing 
businesses to recover.83  From the moment the app launched, the 
physical distancing measures—that are the hallmark of 
population health measures for pandemics—were connected to 
the country’s economic prosperity.84  Furthermore, the media 
 
80 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A flood of 
coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them, MIT TECH. 
REV. (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-
covid-tracing-tracker/. The authors note that “[t]here’s a deluge of apps that 
detect your covid-19 exposure, often with little transparency” and that the 
“Covid Tracing Tracker project will document them.” Id. By August 2020, the 
database had documented 25 individual contact tracing efforts around the 
world. Id. 
81 Media Release, Prime Minister of Australia, et al., COVIDSafe: New 
App to Slow the Spread of Coronavirus (Apr. 26, 2020, 3:13 PM), 
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/covidsafe-new-app-slow-spread-coronavirus 
[hereinafter Media Release]. 
82 According to the Australian Government, the app functions as follows: 
“[w]hen 2 or more app users come close to each other their phones exchange 
Bluetooth® signals and make a series of digital handshakes.” Background to 
COVIDSafe, Close Contact Information: How COVIDSafe identifies close 
contact, AUSTL. GOV’T, https://covidsafe.gov.au/background.html (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2020). Then, “COVIDSafe notes the encrypted information held on 
your phone through the strength of Bluetooth® signals. Once the information 
is uploaded to the National COVIDSafe Data Store, it is then filtered so that 
state and territory health officials can access close contacts.” Id. “The proximity 
for a close contact is approximately 1.5 meters, for a period of 15 minutes or 
more.” Id. 
83 Media Release, supra note 81. As part of the media release, the Minister 
for Health, Greg Hunt, stated: “[w]e are now calling on all Australians to 
download the COVIDSafe app to help protect you, your family and your 
community from further spread of COVID-19[which] will be necessary if we 
are to start easing some of the difficult social distancing restrictions we have 
had to put in place” and he noted that the app “will be one of the critical 
tools . . . use[d] to help protect the health of the community by quickly alerting 
people who may be at risk of having contact with COVID-19.” Id. 
84 See id. The release indicated that “[t]he app . . . received strong support 
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release clearly asserted that the data collected will be used for 
the health and safety of the country, that the data cannot be 
accessed by anyone outside the government tracing scheme, and 
that a misuse of the data will result in criminal prosecution.85  
Moreover, all of the data will be destroyed once the pandemic is 
over.86 
 
The voluntariness of the app is the key difficulty because it 
requires an individual to download the app on their phone and, 
if they are using an Apple iOS platform, to activate the app’s 
operation.87  The app has failed to be adopted in sufficient 
quantity and, therefore, it is difficult for the app to collect the 
posited “sufficiency”88 of data that is needed to be useful in 
containing the pandemic.89  That, in turn, may diminish the 
public appetite to voluntarily adopt the app.  It also reduces the 
clarity around desired isolation parameters, where privacy and 
economic considerations make that a complex decision. 
 
We submit that the primary reason for the lack of adoption 
 
from states and territories and the health sector, which recognise it is a 
valuable tool that will enhance the ability to respond rapidly to local outbreaks, 
and the confidence to know the virus is not silently spreading throughout 
communities.” Id. 
85 Id. Pursuant to the Biosecurity Act, whose broad charter is the 
management of biosecurity threats, including human health within Australia 
and its external territories, it is to be amended to cater to the effective 
introduction of the app. Id. 
86 See COVIDSafe app, After the pandemic, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH, 
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#after-the-
pandemic (last updated Oct. 28, 2020) (“When the Minister for Health declares 
the COVID-19 pandemic over, users will be prompted to delete the app from 
their phone. This will delete all app information on a person’s phone. The 
information contained in the National COVIDSafe Data Store will also be 
destroyed at the end of the pandemic.”). 
87 See Austl. Dep’t of Health, Coronavirus: Information on how to 
download the COVIDSafe app, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4lTSRhyqaU. 
88 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% 
adoption to be effective, MIT TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-
at-less-than-60-percent-download/. 
89 See Chiara Farronato et al., How to Get People to Actually Use Contact-
Tracing Apps, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-
get-people-to-actually-use-contact-tracing-apps. 
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is not one of the widely cited reasons, such as concerns around 
data privacy or “function creep” (the use of contact-tracing 
information gathered being utilized for purposes other than 
originally intended, such as by law enforcement bodies),90 but 
rather because the Australian government failed to mandate its 
adoption, notwithstanding the government’s full power to do 
so.91  Before examining a mandated app in detail, it is first 
necessary to consider the “noise” around the use, or lack of use, 
of the Australian app to date. 
 
Despite the Australian government’s assurances that data 
gathered by the app is secure and that any breach of security 
would be followed by criminal prosecution,92  Australians have 
not embraced the app, notwithstanding the Department of 
Health commissioning a Private Impact Assessment to address 
and mitigate any identified privacy risks for the app.93  The 
Norton Rose Fulbright comparative study suggests that some of 
the possible reasons explaining why the app has not been widely 
adopted are due generally to user privacy concerns.94  
 
90 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36; see also Rae Thomas et 
al., More than privacy: Australians’ concerns and misconceptions about the 
COVIDSafe App: a short report, MEDRXIV, June 9, 2020, at 1, for a survey 
discussing “that the reasons for not downloading included privacy concerns, 
phone capabilities, and beliefs of limited benefit.” “COVIDSafe knowledge 
varied with confusion about purpose and capabilities. Public health messaging 
will need to address these perceptions to achieve sufficient uptake.” Id. 
91 See COVIDSafe app, Privacy, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH, 
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#privacy 
(last updated Oct. 28, 2020); Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, s 477(1). 
92 Media Release, supra note 81. Initially, privacy protections were 
contained in the First COVID-19 Declaration. See First COVID-19 Declaration, 
supra note 65. Privacy protections were also contained in the Second COVID-
19 Declaration. See Second COVID-19 Declaration, supra note 66. On May 15, 
2020, these were disestablished and enacted as changes to the Privacy Act 
(1988), which “was introduced to promote and protect the privacy of individuals 
and to regulate how Australian Government agencies and organisations with 
an annual turnover of more than $3 million, and some other organisations, 
handle personal information.” Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl.). 
93 See MADDOCKS, DEPT. OF HEALTH: THE COVIDSAFE APPLICATION: 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT pt. A, 3—13 (2020), 
https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/covidsafe-
application-privacy-impact-assessment-covidsafe-application-privacy-impact-
assessment.pdf. 
94 See Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36. 
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Specifically, their report suggests that “function creep” might be 
a factor, although the Privacy Act (1988) was amended in 202095 
to clarify that the information gathered is private.96  The app 
does not use GPS (location tracking) and, therefore, the initial 
concerns around the government using the app to track people 
have been somewhat allayed.97  The source code for the app was 
released on a GitHub repository,98 allowing interested 
stakeholders to review it in order to provide a measure of 
restoring faith in the privacy of collected data.  The Australian 
government also sought assurances via an independent 
cybersecurity review99 of the app100 and sought to address 
technical concerns around the effectiveness of the app on an iOS 
operating system.101 
 
95 Id.; see generally Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact 
Information) Act 2020 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter Privacy Act Amendment]. The 
purpose of the amendments to the Privacy Act was to provide for a range of 
offenses and privacy protections in relation to the collection, use, disclosure, 
and deletion of data in connection with the COVIDSafe contact tracing app. 
Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact 
Information) Bill 2020 (Cth) 4 (Austl.). The Bill was passed by both houses on 
May 20, 2020. Id. 
96 See Privacy Act Amendment, supra note 95, p VIIIA div 1. Specifically, 
section 94B of the Privacy Amendment states that the object of the amendment 
is “to assist in preventing and controlling the entry, emergence, establishment 
or spread of the coronavirus known as COVID-19 into Australia or any part of 
Australia by providing stronger privacy protections for COVID app data and 
COVIDSafe users in order to: (a) encourage public acceptance and uptake of 
COVIDSafe; and (b) enable faster and more effective contact tracing.” Id. p 
VIIIA div 1 s 94B. 
97 See Austl. Dep’t of Health, Background to COVIDSafe, Privacy and 
Security – COVIDSafe cannot track location, AUSTL. GOV’T, 
https://covidsafe.gov.au/background.html#COVIDSafe-cannot-track-location 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
98 COVIDSafe, GITHUB, https://github.com/AU-COVIDSafe (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2020). 
99 See generally CYBER SEC. COOP. RSCH. CTR., 
https://www.cybersecuritycrc.org.au/#research-programs (last visited Nov. 15, 
2020), for background information regarding the research team that conducted 
an assessment on Australia’s COVIDSafe app. 
100 See, e.g., Jane Norman, Coronavirus tracing app given thumbs up by 
independent cyber security agency, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020, 10:19 AM), 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-21/cyber-agency-supports-security-
coronavirus-tracing-app/12168136 (exemplifying how the review obtained 
national attention). 
101 See COVIDSafe app, Privacy, supra note 91. See also COVIDSafe app, 
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The Norton Rose Fulbright comparative study also 
canvasses the private sector concerns arising from the use of the 
app.102  For Australia, the study notes that “the data in the 
COVIDSafe App can not be used by private organisations.”103  
Also, it is noted that while Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides 
infrastructure and support, the Australian government stated 
that the U.S. government does not have access to the data in the 
hands of AWS.104  This has been challenged by legal experts 
warning that AWS must still respond to a U.S. subpoena issued 
to them.105  The other private sector concern is that there tends 
to be a centralization of private information with the new 
COVID-19 measures in place.106  However, this is balanced 
against the need for the government to ensure the safety of its 
population such that some adverse impact on privacy will 
occur.107  There are currently no alternate de-centralized 
approaches in play. 
 
It is apparent that there is a range of issues related to 
 
AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-
tools/covidsafe-app (last updated Oct. 28, 2020), for regular updates made by 
the Australian Government Department of Heath regarding the status and 
operation of the app. 
102 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36. This is interesting 
because it acknowledges that the app, and the wider issue of COVID-19 and 
data security, is a public-private agglomeration, rather than a public sector 
responsibility. See supra Section II. 
103 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36. 
104 Id.  
105 Dylan Welch & Linton Besser, Experts warn there are still legal ways 
the US could obtain COVIDSafe data, ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020, 9:38 PM), 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-28/covidsafe-tracing-app-data-may-not-
be-protected-from-usa/12189372; see also Chris Duckett, Home Affairs says US 
CLOUD Act will not be able to penetrate Hunt COVIDSafe Directive, ZDNET 
(May 5, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/home-affairs-says-us-cloud-act-
will-not-be-able-to-penetrate-hunt-covidsafe-directive/ (noting prior 
negotiations with the U.S. Department of Justice that each countries’ laws will 
prevail, respectively, with regard to data stored). 
106 See Brandi Vincent, NIH Unveils Centralized Resource for COVID-19 
Patient Data, NEXTGOV (June 16, 2020), https://www.nextgov.com/analytics-
data/2020/06/nih-unveils-centralized-resource-covid-19-patient-data/166198/. 
107 See Muneeb Ali, Decentralization: Preserving Personal Privacy While 
Fighting COVID-19, COINTELEGRAPH, (June 7, 2020), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/decentralization-preserving-personal-privacy-
while-fighting-covid-19. 
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privacy and differing opinions thereto.  While some Australians 
have asked questions about the virus,108 it is more likely that a 
majority of these individuals have not read the expert 
commentary on privacy issues—including the Privacy Impact 
Assessment—instead relying on their local media, people within 
their own social circle, and their own opinion.109  Wherever data 
is stored and no matter what protections on the data is afforded, 
it seems axiomatic that most people are disinclined to believe 
the assurances provided by authorities and accordingly lack 
trust such that they do not willingly and wittingly provide 
personal data.  It is therefore unsurprising that individuals do 
not opt-in or load the app on their phones, despite assurances 
made about data retention and misuse.110  With respect to the 
concerns raised in other countries by contact-tracing, such 
findings are outlined in the Norton Rose Fulbright study,111 and 
human-rights interest groups statements more generally,112 
 
108 See Sherryn Groch & Felicity Lewis, Can you catch COVID-19 from 
Aussie bats? When are you immune? Your questions answered, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (May 6, 2020), https://www.smh.com.au/national/what-s-
the-death-rate-how-long-will-it-last-your-covid-19-questions-answered-
20200323-p54cy7.html, for a discussion regarding disease immunity and 
whether flying bats can pass on COVID-19. 
109 This would make for an interesting survey—to sample across the 
population the awareness of the app and the decisions made in respect of 
adoption, including it being “too hard.” 
110 See Phil Mercer, Australia Urges Citizens to Download COVID-19 
Tracing App, VOA NEWS (May 4, 2020, 6:17 AM), 
https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/australia-urges-citizens-
download-covid-19-tracing-app. 
111 Norton Rose Fulbright Study, supra note 36. 
112 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s ‘COVIDSafe App’: 
An Experiment in Surveillance, Trust and Law (Apr. 30, 2020) (working paper) 
(on file with the Univ. of New S. Wales Law Faculty Research Series). One of 
the criticisms of the Australian determination made by the Health Minister is 
that the instrument may be modified, repealed, or altered pursuant to section 
477 of the Biosecurity Act and therefore a contact-tracing app may “pose 
extreme risks to many civil liberties including privacy, freedom of movement 
and freedom of association . . . .” Id. at 5–6. Note also the ethical and religious 
viewpoints that come into play. See Samuel Volkin, Digital Contact Tracing 
Poses Ethical Challenges, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.: HUB (May 26, 2020), 
https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/05/26/digital-contact-tracing-ethics/, for a discussion 
by Jeffrey Kahn, director of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, 
regarding “the ethical considerations of using digital technologies for public 
health surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic.” 
23
66	 PACE	INT’L	L.	REV.	 Vol.	33.1	
relating to trust,113 liberty and freedom. 
 
In Australia, as of June 2, 2020, just over six million copies 
of the app had been downloaded.114  Half that number signed up 
within the first three days and the remaining three million 
signed up within a month.115  Flattening off in adoption in such 
circumstances is typical;116 however, from the perspective of the 
app’s usefulness to assist in curbing the pandemic, this data is 
somewhat troubling.  The current population of Australia is 
about 25 million, so the app in Australia is becoming 
irrelevant.117  Similarly, the TraceTogether app launched in 
Singapore has a less than 20% take-up118 and, again, residents 
are concerned about their personal movement being tracked.119 
 
 
113 Katharine Kemp, Trust, UNSW SYDNEY: GRAND CHALLENGES, 
https://grandchallenges.unsw.edu.au/themes/trust (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
The University of New South Wales’ new Grand Challenge on Trust notes a 
recent “disdain for evidence, critical thinking and impartiality” and that they 
“will work to address this crisis, by building connections and incubating new 
initiatives that explore themes such as trust in institutions, trust in experts 
and trust in technology and data.” Id.; see also To Download the Covid-19 App, 
or Not to Download?, 2SER 107.3 (Apr. 20, 2020), https://2ser.com/to-download-
the-covid-19-app-or-not-to-download/ (discussing changes needed, such as 
decentralization, to gain greater trust of Australians using the COVID-19 
tracing app). 
114 Sophie Meixner, How many people have downloaded the COVIDSafe 
app and how central has it been to Australia’s coronavirus response?, ABC 
NEWS (June 1, 2020, 7:01 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-
02/coronavirus-covid19-covidsafe-app-how-many-downloads-greg-
hunt/12295130. 
115 Id. 
116 See Interpreting technology hype, GARTNER, 
https://www.gartner.com/en/research/methodologies/gartner-hype-cycle (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
117 Australia’s COVIDSafe Tracking App Is Slowly Becoming Irrelevant, 
PRIV. AUSTL., https://privacyaustralia.net/covidsafe-app-becomes-
irrelevant/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=covidsafe-
app-becomes-irrelevant (last updated July 1, 2020). 
118 Greenleaf & Kemp, supra note 112, at 3. 
119 Dewey Sim & Kimberly Lim, Coronavirus: why aren’t Singapore 
residents using the TraceTogether contact-tracing app?, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST: CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC (May 18, 2020, 6:45 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3084903/coronavirus-why-
arent-singapore-residents-using-tracetogether. 
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Consequently, for Australia, there is insufficient interest in 
the adoption and use of the app, or thereby, to ensure its role in 
specialized physical isolation.  This means that at the time of 
this writing, the states of Australia had closed borders, because 
large scale physical isolation of the population by geographic 
region—while imprecise and somewhat over-reaching—is more 
certain than relying on the quick method that might have been 
delivered by the app,120 had the app been more widely accepted 
and adopted by the Australian population.121  Further, experts 
in law and information systems opine that the Australian 
contact-tracing arrangements are lacking and are in need of 
amendment.122 
 
Notwithstanding the considerable effort made by the 
Australian federal government to encourage adoption of the app, 
the lack of adoption thereof begs the thought as to how one might 
go about ensuring that life-saving technology, such as contact-
tracing, might be better used in the event of a pandemic such as 
COVID-19.123 
 
120 See COVIDSafe app, About the app, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH, 
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#about-the-
app (last updated Oct. 28, 2020). Installation of the app was voluntary and 
marketed on the basis that it will “protect you, your family and friends and 
save the lives of other Australians.” Id. Registration required the entry of a 
name (which may be a pseudonym), age range, mobile number, and postcode. 
COVIDSafe app, How COVIDSafe works, AUSTL. DEP’T HEALTH, 
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app#how-
covidsafe-works (last updated Oct. 28, 2020). 
121 See MADDOCKS, supra note 93, pt. A, § 1.3, at 3 (“Ensuring public trust 
in the operation of the App will be critical to its successful roll-out.”). 
122 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s COVIDSafe App 
needs more legal protections and transparency to gain trust, UNSW SYDNEY 
LAW (May 1, 2020), https://www.law.unsw.edu.au/news/australias-covidsafe-
app-needs-more-legal-protections-and-transparency-to-gain-trust-0. 
123 See MADDOCKS, supra note 93, pt. A, § 3.2, at 4–5. This is so because, 
while the Maddock’s Private Impact Assessment found that stakeholders 
ensured the development of the app was via a “privacy by design” approach, 
further work was required, including: “communication to the public, with 
clarity about the function and purpose of the App, how the App will work, what 
personal information will be collected by the App, and how that information 
will be used; the need for further assurance that personal information collected 
through the App will only be used for contact tracing; the minimisation of risks 
associated with loss of control over the personal information collected through 
the App once the information is disclosed to State and Territory Public Health 
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VI. DEFAULT OPTIONS 
Given that the voluntary up-take of the app is relatively low, 
how might governments tackle this dilemma in the future?  
Apparently, making contact-tracing apps available does not 
result in widespread adoption per se; nor, as is the case for 
Australia, does widespread information and assurances about 
the operation of the app result in widespread adoption.124  
Generally speaking, begging does not increase the voluntary 
adoption of most things—neither does offering incentives for 
citizens result in ubiquitous acceptance.  With respect to contact-
tracing, Australia seeks the former unsuccessfully,125 while 
Singapore seeks the latter, also unsuccessfully, by offering the 
possibility of winning a prize for citizens loading up the 
TraceTogether app on their cell phones.126  These are not optimal 
situations in times of crisis.  Yet, optimality is critical in times 
of disaster.127  Some might suggest that more sampling of the 
app via “randomized trials” is necessary to determine whether 
the app can be directly responsible for reducing COVID-19 
infections.128  However, this sampling is problematic and 
 
Officials and Contact Tracers; the need to ensure maximum application of the 
‘data minimisation principle’, so that the minimum amount of personal 
information required is collected; the need to ensure that consent is voluntary, 
and provided so that Users of the App properly understand how their personal 
information will be handled; the need to ensure that appropriate consent is 
obtained from parents/guardians for Users who are children under the age of 
16; the need for further assurance around potential security risks; further 
clarity about retention of personal information collected through the App after 
the end of the COVID-19 pandemic; and the desirability of further clarity about 
data governance arrangements, including in ICT and other contracts or other 
arrangements, between entities involved in the implementation and operation 
of the App.” Id. 
124 See Mercer, supra note 110; Privacy Act Amendment, supra note 95, p 
VIIIA. 
125 Mercer, supra note 110. 
126 Trace Together, Safer Together, supra note 77. 
127 Samira Sadat Pourhosseini, Ali Ardalan & Mohammad Hossien 
Mehrolhassani, Key Aspects of Providing Healthcare Services in Disaster 
Response Stage, 44 IRAN J. PUB. HEALTH 111, 114 (2015). 
128 Kelly Servick, COVID-19 contact tracing apps are coming to a phone 
near you. How will we know whether they work?, SCI. MAG. (May 21, 2020, 5:10 
PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/countries-around-world-are-
rolling-out-contact-tracing-apps-contain-coronavirus-how. 
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expensive.129  Time and money are not presently in a relatively 
large supply.  The fastest way to determine the relation between 
contact-tracing apps and COVID infections was for Australia to 
mandate—and enforce—the use of the app. 
 
It is certainly the case that the Australian government was 
empowered to mandate the app.130  However, such an action was 
presumably deemed unpalatable.131  What else can the 
government do?  The evidence for this as a possible solution to 
larger-scale physical isolation, privacy concerns 
notwithstanding, comes from another life-saving quarter: organ 
donations.132 
 
In the field of behavioral economics, it has been shown that 
defaults save lives.133  Johnson and Goldstein have argued, in a 
paper published in 2003, that default options may lead to 
remarkable differences in the preferences of individuals, and 
their study of organ donors across countries outlines this 
point.134  There are also strong arguments in favor of variations 
on the default option, such as “mandated choice.”135  Johnson 
and Goldstein used both natural and experimental data across 
three experiments by testing to see the difference between 
asking potential donors whether they wanted to be an organ 
donor (as against the default option of being an organ donor) 
and, in order to opt-out, needing to make the choice not to be an 
 
129 Id. 
130 See Biosecurity Act of 2015, supra note 64, ch 8 p 2 d 2 s 477. 
131 Greenleaf & Kemp, supra note 112, at 2, 9–10. 
132 See generally Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save 
Lives?, 302 SCI. MAG. 1338, 1338–39 (2003) (providing background material 
regarding organ donation statistics and the default rules of various countries). 
133 Id. at 1339. 
134 Id. at 1338–39. 
135 Such approaches require a timely advanced choice by citizens, as 
opposed to an opt-in or opt-out process. See P. Chouhan & H. Draper, Modified 
mandated choice for organ procurement, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 157, 159 (2003); 
Susan E. Herz, Two Steps to Three Choices: A New Approach to Mandated 
Choice, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 340, 342 (1999); Aaron Spital, 
Mandated Choice for Organ Donation: Time to Give It a Try, 125 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 66, 67 (1996). For the purposes of this article, the authors do 
not endorse any particular approach. 
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organ donor.136  In the countries where presumed consent (opt-
out) was the rule, organ donors ranged from the lowest of 85.9% 
in Sweden to the highest of 99.98% in Austria.137  Where explicit 
consent was required for organ donation (opt-in) the rates in 
surveyed countries ranged from the lowest of 4.25% in Denmark 
to the highest of 27.5% in The Netherlands.138  Note, however, 
that in the case of The Netherlands, there was a concerted and 
consistent campaign to raise the level of organ donations, 
including sending 12 million letters and the creation of a 
national donor registry that “failed to change the effective 
consent rate.”139 
 
Although the Johnson and Goldstein study was motivated 
by the low permission rates of organ donation in the United 
States, which was paradoxically at odds with the then 85% 
approval of the idea of organ donation ultimately in the United 
States,140 the study researched European countries.141 
 
In 2012, the Australian government introduced “My Health 
Record” as an opt-in online health record, holding personal key 
health information for each Australian; however, in 2016, the 
Australian government changed this to an opt-out process.142  
The idea of the record was to facilitate medical professional 
access to a patient’s health record for general information or in 
 
136 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1339. 
140 Id. at 1338; see also THE GALLUP ORG., INC., THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION (1993), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/19990209044121/http://www.transweb.org:80/ref
erence/articles/gallup_survey/gallup_index.html], for a survey conducted by 
The Gallup Organization for The Partnership for Organ Donation at Harvard 
School of Public Health on American’s attitudes toward organ donation and 
transplantation. 
141 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338–39. 
142 Evaluation of the My Health Record Participation Trials, AUSTL. DEP’T 
HEALTH, 
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ehealth-
evaluation-trials (last updated May 4, 2017); Austl. Digital Health Agency, 
What is My Health Record?, Background information, MY HEALTH REC., 
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/for-you-your-family/what-is-my-health-
record (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
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the circumstances of an emergency.143  After concerns were 
raised around the change to opt-out, including by those 
concerned about data privacy,144 the Australian government 
made some amendments to allow permanent destruction of 
records and to disallow privatization or commercialization of the 
system.145 
 
Under the unamended version of the Australian scheme, 
around 2.5 million Australians—around ten percent of the 
Australian population—had opted out of the scheme and, of 
those, 1.147 million —nearly half of the 2.5 million Australians 
that opted out—withdrew their consent after the opt-out period 
was extended.146  Additional cancellations occurred when the 
amendments were introduced.147  Nonetheless, at the relevant 
time, the Australian position meant that 90% of the population 
had selected the online health record by default in stark contrast 
with the opt-in position.148  Recall that the download of the 
COVIDSafe app in Australia sits at above six million—over 25% 
of the population.149 
 
 
143 Austl. Digital Health Agency, What is My Health Record?, My Health 
Record is an online summary of your key health information, MY HEALTH REC., 
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/for-you-your-family/what-is-my-health-
record (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
144 Austl. Digital Health Agency, Australian Government passes 
legislation to strengthen My Health Record privacy, MY HEALTH REC. (Nov. 26, 
2018), https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/news-and-media/my-health-record-
stories/legislation-strengthens-privacy. 
145 Media Release, Austl. Digital Health Agency, Austl. Gov’t, Opt in or 
opt out of My Health Record at any time in your life: Australian Parliament 
strengthens privacy protections of My Health Record (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:54 PM), 
https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au/news-and-media/media-releases/opt-in-
or-opt-out-any-time. 
146 Justin Hendry, Millions opt-out of My Health Record: ADHA Reveals 
Final Figure, ITNEWS (Feb. 20, 2019, 4:24 PM), 
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/millions-opt-out-of-my-health-record-
519572. 
147 Id. 
148 SIGGINS MILLER, EVALUATION OF THE PARTICIPATION TRIALS FOR THE MY 
HEALTH RECORD: FINAL REPORT 124 (2016), 
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/A892B3781
E14E1B3CA25810C000BF7C6/$File/Evaluation-of-the-My-Health-Record-
Participation-Trials-Report.pdf 
149 Meixner, supra note 114. 
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Nonetheless, it is apparent that Australians are fairly wary 
about their health information being online and accessible; by 
means fair or foul, and part of their objections in the case of My 
Health Record, may very well have arisen about opt-out 
determining the default position.150  This may be in part because 
Australia is a Western democracy and its approach towards 
authority follows same; something it shares in common with the 
United States and most of Europe.151 
 
It is true that neither the organ donation study nor the 
Australian health record example, amount to determinative 
positions regarding how to approach the adoption of an app in a 
global pandemic; but they are at least instructive.  The Johnson 
and Goldstein study elucidates that the way options are framed 
does appear to influence the outcome that follows.152  This also 
holds true for the Australian experience with My Health Record 
and the COVIDSafe app.153  It seems reasonable to infer from 
the Australian experience that opt-ins affecting the privacy of 
information present a very difficult question: a question most 
likely to be deferred, and by default, an opt-in not being selected.  
To what extent such deferral is impacted upon by such privacy 
concerns is—in the pure sense or in the more complex—
encompassing other concerns, including the source of data such 
as biobanking and concerns arising from the possible adoption 
 
150 Including researcher opinion that the system seemed less suited for 
healthcare and more suited to the collection of data. See Paul Power, Opinion: 
Is there a smarter way for the controversial My Health Record system?, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.healthcareit.com.au/article/opinion-there-smarter-way-
controversial-my-health-record-system. 
151 See Sam Schechner, French Contact-Tracing App Struggles with Slow 
Adoption. It Isn’t Alone, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2020, 3:12 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/french-contact-tracing-app-struggles-with-slow-
adoption-it-isnt-alone-11592928266 (“[T]here are signs France isn’t alone in 
seeing low adoption levels. Italy’s app recently crossed three million 
downloads, which covers around 5% to 6% of its population. Denmark’s app is 
at 300,000 downloads or roughly 5%. Norway, for its part, recently suspended 
use of its app after complaints from privacy regulators, who said the low 
incidence of the disease no longer made the app worth the encroachment on 
individual privacy it required.”). 
152 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 132, at 1338. 
153 See SIGGINS MILLER, supra note 148, at 85; COVIDSafe app, About the 
app, supra note 120. 
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and commercialization of data, which remains, for now, 
unanswered. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the event of a pandemic, we posit that there lies a difficult 
balance for governments between liberty on the one hand, and 
prospects of survival on the other; with respect to the latter, 
apparently lies the question on how to achieve it, without giving 
up too much prosperity in the process.  It is a complex and 
difficult decision for a government because it involves an 
inevitable compromise of factors such as privacy, data security, 
ethical considerations, and safety that conflate the ideological 
differences between the rights of the individual on the one hand, 
and the whole-of-society on the other. 
 
The Australian COVIDSafe app is an example of the 
difficulties associated with dealing with a complex and evolving 
pandemic.  While there is no apparent solution as to how to best 
deal with a crisis that changes often and quickly, it at least 
seems apparent that where digital options—such as an app—are 
available and, where those options might be used for the 
immediate and beneficial societal health improvement and 
protection, governments might find opt-out determinations more 
immediately useful.  That being so, then the fallout from the use 
of the opt-out option can be altered, eased, or removed when the 
health crisis is averted.  When and for whom this is the most 
appropriate course of action is a matter, at least in Western 
countries, for their democratically elected leaders. 
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